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Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source 
Industries 
Michele Boldrin  
David K. Levine  
INTRODUCTION  
From a historical perspective, open source industries are the 
opposite of an exception: They are the rule that almost every 
emerging industry has followed through the centuries. Economic 
growth, one is tempted to argue, owes more to the open source 
approach to economic and industrial innovation than to almost any 
other institutional arrangement apart from private property. We are 
not trying to be provocative; the last statement should be taken 
literally, at least from a historical perspective. Reciprocal imitation-
cum-improvement among a relatively large set of innovators is the 
way in which new and successful industries have almost always 
developed in societies where some form of private property was 
allowed and profit-seeking private initiative permitted. There are, 
among emerging industries, a few remarkable exceptions to the 
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innovation-imitation-improvement (―3-I‖) dynamics. One example is 
the various ―tele‖-something enterprises of the first half of the 20th 
century: telegraph, telephone, and television. But even in these cases, 
it was not for lack of many simultaneous innovators-entrepreneurs 
that the 3-I dynamics did not emerge. Rather, patent laws and a bit of 
luck allowed a few (even likely undeserving ones, as in the case of 
Alexander Graham Bell)
1
 to play the role of the big monopolist from 
the start. Absent a dominant monopolist, well protected by an armor 
of patents, most industries seem to develop by means of the 3-I 
dynamics that open source arrangements make possible and fuel. 
Open source (―OS‖), as a general method of allocating property 
rights among the products of innovative activity, can be formalized in 
a few simple rules. 
First, the inventor owns the objects produced, but not the general 
―idea‖ or ―principle‖ behind them, which can be used by others and is 
not kept secret intentionally. Other individuals and firms are not 
legally excluded from the using such ideas or principles. 
Second, competitors are, therefore, free to imitate and improve on 
others‘ discoveries, as long as this is achieved voluntarily and 
without coercion, and as long as the goods and services used are 
lawfully purchased. 
Finally, ideas are more or less voluntarily disseminated, either via 
organized networks or informally, through the interaction of industry 
participants. 
Upon a little reflection, it is easy to see that these are the 
characteristics of any competitive industry in which legal instruments 
that exclude competitors from using others‘ ideas are not used to 
erect barriers to entry. In spite of the current trend toward Universal 
Intellectual Property (―UIP‖), competitive industries are still 
widespread, including the OS system. A few of the most frequently 
encountered industries include the retail trade and wholesale 
distribution sectors; the transportation sector and the airline industry 
in particular; the clothing industry (especially fashion); the food and 
beverage industries; the furniture and home appliance industries; and 
the (now temporarily infamous) mortgage industry and the financial 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Antonio Meucci http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Meucci 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
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sector more generally, where imitation and innovation go hand in 
hand. If we take time to look back at history, OS appears everywhere, 
so much so that it is worth mentioning only the more dramatic cases. 
These include situations in which the transmission and dissemination 
of ideas among competitors took place in a semi-organized or even 
cooperative form: the Cornish engine of the first half of the 19th 
century; the Japanese cotton-spinning industry between the 19th and 
the 20th centuries; the Bangladesh garment industry in the late 20th 
century; the oxygen steel-making industry in the middle 20th century; 
the horticultural industry of Almeria since the 1980s; and the Italian 
shoes, apparel, ceramic, and leather districts at least since the end of 
World War II. 
Interestingly, economists, especially those concerned with the 
theory of innovation and economic growth, have tended to ignore 
such examples. This might be why the many contemporaneous OS 
markets (among which the one for OS software is attracting special 
attention) are not well understood by them. The only three studies 
considering the economic implications of OS software are by Hann, 
Roberts, Slaughter, and Fielding;
2
 Lerner and Tirole;
3
 and Llanes.
4
 A 
central source of surprise is that innovation can thrive in a market 
without traditional intellectual property; this is something that, 
according to established economic theory, should not happen. This 
leads many pundits and economists alike to interpret the OS 
organization in the software (and now bioengineering) sector as a 
kind of ―gift exchange‖ arrangement. Established economic theory 
fails to understand which set of incentives could motivate people to 
engage in the costly activity of innovating in absence of intellectual 
property; OS is an aberration that standard economic theory cannot 
explain.  
 
 2. Il-Horn Hann, Jeff Roberts, Sandra Slaughter & Roy Fielding, An Empirical Analysis 
of Economic Returns to Open Source Participation (2004) (unpublished manuscript, 
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/ hann/publications_files/economic_returns_to_open_source_participa 
tion.pdf). 
 3. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economic of Technology Sharing: Open Source and 
Beyond (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10956, 2004). 
 4. Gastón Llanes, Technology Sharing in Open Source (Dec. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, http://www.eco.uc3m.es/temp/agenda/Gaston_LLanes.pdf). 
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In fact, as a matter of theory, we have argued that there is no 
reason to believe that intellectual property or monopoly power is 
needed for innovation.
5
 The market for OS software is the poster 
child for this perspective. Llanes‘ is the first paper that appears to 
understand how OS and proprietary models of innovation can coexist 
in the same industry, and to provide a theoretical model of such 
coexistence.
6
  
We will use this introduction to summarize briefly the reasons 
why OS industries should not come as a surprise to economists well 
trained in traditional competitive theory, and to dissect the economic 
logic underpinning them. Next we discuss the logical contradictions 
(or the plain neglect of facts) behind the common misconception that 
an OS industry is not viable. Because this misconception is the 
dominant view both among economists and legal scholars, we will 
spend more time on the pars destruens than on the pars construens, 
for, paradoxically, the former seems to be still more necessary than 
the latter. This is again explained by the fact that OS markets are the 
rule, not the exception. Nevertheless, people working in the area of 
intellectual property appear unable to see their existence and account 
for it theoretically, due to the distorting analytical lenses they are 
wearing. It is upon those distorting lenses we aim our fire.  
First, understand that an OS market is the classic example of a 
competitive market. It is characterized by the voluntary renunciation 
of copyright and patent rights. Buyers are entitled to make copies of 
the original product they purchased, modified or not, and sell them. 
―Free software‖ in this context means free as in freedom, not free as 
in beer.
7
 There is also voluntary renunciation of trade-secrecy; the 
original creator publishes the source code—the ―blueprint‖ for 
producing the software—along with the software itself. Some OS 
software has the further requirement that as a condition of use, buyers 
make their modifications available under the same terms.
8
 More 
 
 5. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation, 55 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 435, 436 (2008). 
 6. See Llanes, supra note 4. 
 7. GNU Project, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 8. See GNU Project, Various Licenses and Comments About Them, http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy/license-list.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (describing the terms of various OS 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/11
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generally, in OS industries other than the software industry, different 
kinds of formal or informal arrangements ensure that users of 
―common inventions‖ do not exclude potential competitors from 
access and that the relevant information about innovations circulates 
widely. The OS movement has been criticized, described in ways 
ranging from a hindrance
9
 to socialistic,
10
 so it might be surprising to 
hear it called a model of perfect competition. Yet that is what it is, as 
much so as the market for wheat. Every purchaser of software can 
compete with the seller and one another, and they often do.  
Given that there are fixed costs of producing software and (it is 
commonly thought) competition drives profits to zero, how does this 
market function? How are the fixed costs covered? In the absence of 
profits from monopoly power, the source of income used to pay fixed 
costs is competitive rent. In our research we have investigated three 
issues. First, what is the source of the competitive rents that pay the 
bills of software developers? Second, is the market a real market? 
That is, do software producers get adequate compensation for the 
fixed costs of their efforts? Or is OS software, as is sometimes 
alleged, simply an elaborate altruistic charity? Finally, we ask how 
significant the OS software market is. Is it a thriving source of 
innovation or a free-rider off the innovations of more traditional 
closed-source IP-protected software, making cheap imitations of 
software that never would have been produced in the first place 
absent monopoly power? 
The evidence (and the common sense of anyone involved with OS 
software) shows that the source of competitive rents is the 
complementary sale of expertise. That is, to earn a rent through the 
sale of something, it must be something in short supply. Copies of 
software may be in short supply, but we shall see that the duplication 
of copies is sufficiently quick so that only small rents can be obtained 
through the sale of copies. Purchasers of copies of software 
 
licenses). 
 9. Craig Mundie, Vice President, Microsoft, Remarks at the New York University Stern 
School of Business (May 3, 2001), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/craig/05-03shared 
source.mspx. 
 10. Tom Sanders, SAP Dismisses Open Source Innovation, VNUNET.COM, Nov. 10, 2005, 
http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2145809/sap-dismisses-open-source (describing Shai 
Agassi‘s speech). 
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programs, however, also have a demand for services, ranging from 
support and consulting to customization.
11
 They naturally prefer to 
hire the creators of the programs who in the process of writing the 
software have developed specialized expertise that is not easily 
matched by imitators. 
To understand the sources of competitive rents in this market, it is 
helpful to look at an example. A leading OS software firm is Red 
Hat, a company that sells distributions of the operating system 
GNU/Linux.
12
 This is a modified and customized version of the 
underlying system with many features that can be optionally 
installed. Although the base system is in principle obtained by Red 
Hat for free, in fact the company pays the developers. Alan Cox, one 
of the main kernel developers, previously worked for Red Hat.
13
 Red 
Hat also is a contributor to the Open Source Development Lab 
(―OSDL‖) that employs Linus Torvalds, who also benefited from a 
substantial ―gift‖ of stock options from Red Hat.14 Beyond this, the 
customization and testing conducted by Red Hat is costly. So Red 
Hat faces a substantial fixed cost of providing ―Red Hat‖ brand 
software. Let us first consider rents earned through the sale of 
physical copies. First, in this market, physical copies of software sell 
for greater than marginal cost. Using prices quoted on the Internet on 
July 10, 2002, Red Hat charged $59.95 for a package containing its 
system.
15
 Because it is based on the underlying GNU/Linux system, 
competitors can legally duplicate and sell the exact same ―Red Hat‖ 
system. In fact, at least two companies, Hcidesign and 
Linuxemporium, did exactly this. On July 10, 2002, Hcidesign 
offered for sale Red Hat Linux 7.2 for a price of $16.00, about one-
 
 11. On a personal note, one of the authors, Levine, wrote and maintains an open source 
software project, Jarnal. He has been approached several times by firms with requests to 
customize the software for a fee. 
 12. For example, in 2005, Red Hat reported net profits of nearly $80 million. Yahoo!, 
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=4416483-219997-224683 
&type=sect&TabIndex=2&Companyid=5746&ppu=%252fdefault.aspx%253fcik%253d108742
3 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 13. Wikipedia, Alan Cox, http://Wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Cox (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
 14. Gary Rivlin, Leader of the Free World: How Linus Torvalds Became Benevolent 
Director of Planet Linux, the Biggest Collaborative Project in History, WIRED, http://www. 
wired.com/wired/archive/11.11/linus_pr.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 15. See generally Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
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third the price charged by Red Hat.
16
 Linuxemporium.co.uk offered a 
similar deal.
17
 Nevertheless, Red Hat sold many more $59.95 
packages than Hcidesign and Linuxemporium did $16.00 packages.
18
 
These companies never represented a dangerous market threat to Red 
Hat.  
Notice that the premium charged by Red Hat was not likely due to 
the physical scarcity of copies. Rather, the premium resulted from the 
sale of expertise that came with developing the system. Anyone who 
has used computer software knows that it rarely functions as 
expected. If you bought software and had a question or problem, 
whom would you prefer to call: the people who wrote and developed 
the program, or the people who duplicated the CD? In fact, the sale of 
expertise by charging a premium on physical copies has not turned 
out to be the most successful business model. Red Hat eventually 
concluded that it was not selling enough $59.95 copies and switched 
to a different revenue model.
19
 What previously had been sold is now 
given away for free as ―Fedora Core‖ and is used as a platform to get 
feedback on features that are incorporated into the commercial 
system called ―Red Hat Enterprise Linux.‖20 The latter is available 
only by annual subscription at a price that, depending on features, on 
August 24, 2005, ranged from $349 to $2,499.
21
 The following blurb 
from Red Hat promotional material on its website makes clear what it 
is for which people are paying: ―Unlimited access to service and 
support: Subscriptions include ongoing service and support to 
guarantee your systems remain secure, reliable, and up-to-date. When 
you have a technical question, you‘ll speak to Red Hat Certified 
Engineers. Or you can access a self-serve knowledgebase of technical 
information.‖22  
 
 16. See generally Hcidesign, http://www.hcidesign.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 17. See generally The Linux Emporium, http://linuxemporium,co.uk (last visited Apr. 8, 
2009). 
 18. See generally Red Hat, supra note 15. 
 19. See generally id. 
 20. See generally id. 
 21. See generally id. 
 22. Redhat.com, Value of Red Hat Subscription, http://www.redhat.com/software/ 
subscriptions.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
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Notice how this market works: First expertise is passed from the 
developers to ―Red Hat Certified Software Engineers.‖ As time goes 
on, others acquire the expertise, the stock of expertise expands, and 
the price at which it can be sold decreases. Of course, in the 
meantime new innovations are created and new expertise is 
generated. 
The presence of profitable firms such as Red Hat—not to mention 
IBM—in the OS industry suggests that it is a viable business and not 
an altruistic activity. Lerner and Tirole have documented some of the 
financial benefits that are available for contributors to OS projects.
23
 
For example, the programmers who develop the Apache webserver 
are ranked according to the significance of their contributions and 
hold other jobs. Work by Hann, Roberts, Slaughter, and Fielding 
shows that the salaries they receive in these other jobs is heavily 
influenced by their rank within the Apache organization.
24
 In other 
words, the ―expertise‖ model at the Apache Foundation is much like 
that in academia: The software writers write software to receive 
recognition and financial payment for the expertise they demonstrate 
through their published product. 
Examination of particular individual developers reinforces this 
point. Linus Torvalds is a multi-millionaire,
25
 and Bram Cohen, the 
developer of BitTorrent, recently received $8.75 million in venture 
capital funding for his OS project.
26
 These figures and the success of 
OS software also teach us something important about the (expected) 
payments needed to get smart people such as Torvalds or Cohen to 
develop innovative software. It is unlikely that Linus Torvalds 
originally wrote Linux with the aim of becoming a multi-millionaire, 
yet he must have had some hope for revenue stream when starting his 
work. His current wealth is probably higher than he actually 
expected, yet it is considerably less than that of someone like Bill 
Gates.
27
 Hence, at least in the case of Linus Torvalds, the opportunity 
 
 23. Lerner & Tirole, supra note 3, at 8. 
 24. Hann et al., supra note 2, at 4. 
 25. Rivlin, supra note 14. 
 26. Elizabeth Millard, BitTorrent Gets Venture Capital Boost, EWEEK.COM, Sept. 27, 
2005, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Infrastructure/BitTorrent-Gets-Venture-Capital-Boost/. 
 27. See generally Wikipedia, Bill Gates, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Gates (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
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cost for writing innovative software is not in the tens of billions of 
dollars, but only in the millions. This is worth keeping in mind when 
someone claims that, without the huge monopoly, rents innovators 
would not be innovating. It is equally significant that this thriving and 
innovative industry is financed largely through competitive rents. 
Finally, it is possible to imagine that OS is not a real industry at 
all. It could be that it exists only because it is able to free-ride off the 
innovations created in the proprietary part of the industry, in which 
the monopoly power of copyright plays a key role. Certainly, it is true 
that Linux is a knock-off of Unix and that Openoffice Writer is a 
knock-off of Microsoft Word. But this means little because 
practically all software, proprietary or not, is an imitation of some 
other software. Microsoft Windows is an imitation of the Macintosh, 
which is an imitation of Smalltalk. Microsoft Word is an imitation of 
Wordperfect, which is an imitation of Wordstar. Microsoft Excel is 
an imitation of Lotus 1-2-3, which is an imitation of Visicalc.
28
 And 
so forth, and so on. 
A good example is the webserver.
29
 The first webserver was 
written by Tim Berners-Lee at CERN in 1990
30
 and was followed 
shortly by the NCSA webserver written by Robert McCool.
31
 Neither 
of these saw much commercial use, both were public domain, and 
both were effectively publicly funded. This initial pattern is similar to 
the way that basic research (for example in pharmaceuticals, which is 
generally publicly funded) gets new lines of innovation and 
production started. Following this, Netscape Corporation introduced 
a proprietary webserver and at about the same time Apache took over 
the code from the NCSA webserver.
32
 Both of these servers survive 
 
 28. On the Windows, Macintosh, and Smalltalk, see Mac Lore pt. 1, http://www.h-net.org/ 
mac/lore1.html (last visited May 2, 2009). On the Microsoft Word, etc., see Wikipedia, 
Microsoft Word, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_word (last visited May 2, 2009). On 
the Microsoft Excel, etc., see Wikipedia, Microsoft Excel, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Microsoft_excel (last visited May 2, 2009). 
 29. Wikipedia, Web Server, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/web_server (last visited Apr. 8, 
2009). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Wikipedia, Robert McCool, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McCool (last visited 
May 2, 2009). 
 32. See Wikipedia, Netscape, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netscape#Early_years (last 
visited May 2, 2009); Wikipedia, Apache HTTP Server, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apache_ 
HTTP_Server (last visited May 2, 2009). 
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today, with the Netscape server having mutated into the Sun One 
webserver, and Apache having become the dominant force in the 
webserver industry.  
Apache is currently the leading webserver on the Internet, holding 
a greater than 45% market share.
33
 Many new features have been 
added to Apache since its inception, as well as to the competing 
Microsoft product.
34
 The evidence suggests that Apache has been at 
least as innovative as the others in introducing new features. 
Certainly there is no evidence here that the OS model was less able 
than the proprietary model to turn a basic experimental idea into a 
commercially viable product, or that it free-rode off of ideas 
developed in a proprietary product. 
Another interesting case is that of word processing. Many OS 
alternatives to Microsoft Word exist, including Kword, AbiWord, 
and OpenOffice Writer, the latter being the most widely used.
35
 How 
did the cost of developing this software—financed as it was by an OS 
model—compare to the cost of developing Microsoft Word? The fact 
is that most of the cost of writing software is not in the observation 
that it might be nice to have a button to justify text, or in the 
algorithms for spacing lines (which were, after all, developed by 
Gutenberg back in 1450)
36
 but rather in the detailed implementation 
and debugging of computer code. As far as we know, none of these 
OS projects benefited at all from the work done by Microsoft in 
developing its detailed computer code. Indeed, the development of 
these OS projects was probably more expensive than the 
development of Microsoft Word. The single most difficult and 
expensive programming task faced by the developers of these 
projects appears to be the need to reverse engineer Microsoft Word 
documents and to provide compatible formatting capability so that 
 
 33. Netcraft.com, April 2009 Web Server Survey, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_ 
server_survey.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 34. See Wikipedia, Apache HTTP Server, supra note 32; Windows Server 2008, 
Overview, http://www.microsoft.com/windowserver2008/en/us/overview.aspx (last visited May 
2, 2009). 
 35. ReviewSaurus—Windows Software Download, http://www.reviewsaurus.com/online-
office/offline-online-microsoft-word-alternatives/ (last visited May 2, 2009). 
 36. See Wikipedia, Johannes Gutenberg, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Guten 
berg (last visited May 2, 2009). 
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documents in Microsoft Word are usable and other documents can be 
exchanged with Microsoft Word. Had these projects gone first, this 
substantial cost would have been avoided. It is also worth noting that 
the competitive rents generated by these projects are significantly 
smaller than they would have been had they hit the market before 
Microsoft Word. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that perfect 
competition would have delivered both these programs, as it did, and 
Microsoft Word as well. 
Probably the most innovative program in the past few years is 
BitTorrent, a program that decentralizes and vastly increases the 
speed at which very large files can be downloaded off the Internet. It 
is commercially successful in the sense that 50,000 copies a day are 
downloaded.
37
 It is also sufficiently innovative that it is now being 
imitated by Microsoft.
38
 BitTorrent, however, is OS and, according to 
its website, Bram Cohen, the author, maintains the program for a 
living.
39
 
The final point to emphasize here is that the market for software is 
not unique. Innovation and competition have gone hand-in-hand in 
other industries ranging from the market for financial securities
40
 to 
the fashion industry.
41
 The message of OS software is a message for 
all industries: Intellectual property (―IP‖) is not needed for innovation 
here. 
Llanes provides the first fully articulated model of such 
behavior.
42
 In his theory, proprietary and OS firms generally coexist, 
producing goods and services that are highly substitutable to each 
 
 37. SourceForge.net, http://sourceforge.net/project/stats/detail.php?group_id=33044&ugn 
=bittorrent&type=prdownload&mode=year&year=2005&package_id=0 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2009). 
 38. James Niccolai, Microsoft Readies BitTorrent Alternative: Avalanche Technology 
Could Make It Easier to Distribute Big Files over the Internet, INFOWORLD.COM, June 16, 
2005, http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/16/HNmsbittorrent_1.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2009). 
 39. BitTorrent, Management, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/management (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 40. Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 213 J. FIN. ECON. 
25 (1980). 
 41. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2006). 
 42. Llanes, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
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other.
43
 Both kinds of firms invest in research and development 
(―R&D‖) and, although the OS firms share with one another the 
results of their R&D expenditure, proprietary firms keep it 
exclusively for themselves by means of patents.
44
 In Llanes‘ theory, 
proprietary firms are larger and fewer than OS firms and often, but 
not necessarily, produce goods of higher quality unless there are only 
OS firms, in which case they produce the same goods the proprietary 
firms would have produced.
45
 Interestingly, although OS firms 
always appear as long as there is demand for a good or service that is 
supplied in limited quantity, proprietary firms need not emerge (even 
if IP is allowed) if the complementary good is important enough in 
relation to the patentable product.
46
  
I. WHAT‘S WRONG WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 
One might wonder if an explicit anti-IP position such as the one 
we are taking is unreasonable in light of recent evolutions. Around 
the world, the opposite tide is in fact rising: India has just adjusted its 
patent laws to comply with TRIPS requirements,
47
 in particular in the 
areas of pharmaceutical and biotechnologies; China is slowly but 
surely doing the same for both copyright and patents;
48
 the European 
Union pushes forward with the European Patent harmonization 
plan;
49
 and Mexico, Brazil, and other developing countries are hard 
pressed to follow soon. That the European Parliament, in a rare 
moment of wisdom and foresight, rejected the proposal to patent 
software is only a temporary setback quickly compensated by Mr. 
Sarkozy‘s recent decision to dramatically tighten the screw around 
the neck of anyone exchanging copyrighted files through peer-to-peer 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 18. 
 47. See Prabuddha Ganguli, Indian Path Towards TRIPS Compliance, 25 WORLD PAT. 
INFO. 143 (2003). 
 48. See NPC.gov, New China Patent Law Is Unveiled, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/ 
news/Legislation/2009-02/10/content_1469484.htm (last visited May 2, 2009). 
 49. See Wealthy Nations Move Ahead with Patent Harmonisation [sic], http://www. 
ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/02/12/wealthy-nations-move-ahead-with-patent-harmonisation/ (last 
visited May 3, 2009). 
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networks.
50
 The tide is rising, and nothing seems capable of stopping 
it; as a successful pamphlet reminded us a few years ago, 
―Rembrandts [are hiding] in the attic‖ and the ―greatest untapped 
asset opportunity‖ will be tapped by dexterous users of patents and 
copyright.
51
 But is there a reason to try stopping it? What is wrong 
with the idea and the practice of UIP? 
To start seeing what is wrong with UIP, we want to consider the 
basic metaphor that appears to be inspiring its supporters. It goes like 
this: The process of securing IP over ideas is logically and 
economically equivalent to the establishment of well-defined 
property rights on parcels of unowned land. Without well-defined and 
secure property rights, the fertile lands of the Western frontier could 
not be efficiently cultivated or put to pasture, greatly reducing 
economic development. Similarly, if ideas are not someone‘s 
exclusive private property, they cannot be developed and brought to 
fruition. The wide open and uncharted territories of profitable and 
appropriable ideas are there, just ahead of us—mostly lawyers—the 
brave colonizers of the Third Millennium.  
This is common wisdom. But is something wrong with it? Our 
answer is radical, for we find that almost everything is wrong with 
this vision. We focus on legal theories of IP that have an economic 
underpinning, that is, on legal theories arguing that UIP is a desirable 
state of the world because it somehow maximizes social welfare and 
allocates it efficiently among potential claimants.  
A. Ideas in the Public Domain 
A historical battle for the advancement of the UIP frontier was 
fought and won a few years ago in the United States Congress, and its 
result subsequently was engraved in stone by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In 1998, Congress extended the term of copyright by twenty 
years (through the Copyright Term Extension Act)
52
 while 
 
 50. See Ars Technica, France‘s Plan to Turn ISPs into Copyright Cops on Track, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/01/frances-plan-to-turn-isps-into-copyright-cops-
on-track.ars (last visited May 2, 2009). 
 51. KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE 
HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS (2000). 
 52. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 
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simultaneously extending its breadth and stiffening the penalties 
associated with its violation (through the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act).
53
 The extension of copyright term has been 
retroactive, applying not only to new works but also to existing ones. 
In spite of the obvious and well-known economic argument that 
extending copyright on existing works cannot possibly increase their 
supply,
54
 a number of specious arguments
55
 have been advanced as to 
how retroactive extension somehow serves to ―promote the progress 
of . . . useful arts.‖56 Subsequently, the Supreme Court acquiesced to 
these principles in its ruling in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
57
 The Court 
majority ruled that: 
The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to 
suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a ―limited 
Tim[e]‖ if it may later be extended for another ―limited 
Tim[e]‖ . . . . In petitioners‘ view, a time prescription, once set, 
becomes forever ―fixed‖ or ―inalterable.‖ The word ―limited,‖ 
however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the 
time of the Framing, ―limited‖ meant what it means today: 
confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. 
Thus understood, a timespan appropriately ―limited‖ as applied 
to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be 
―limited‖ when applied to existing copyrights. . . . History 
reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting to 
authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term 
extensions so that all under copyright protection will be 
governed evenhandedly under the same regime. Moreover, 
because the Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights 
also authorizes patents, the Court‘s inquiry is significantly 
 
287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)). 
 53. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 54. See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01–618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard. 
edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf. 
 55. 141 CONG. REC. § 3390 (1995) (statements of Sens. Hatch and Feinstein, article by 
Prof. Arthur Miller, and comments of Dennis S. Karjala), available at http://www.public.asu. 
edu/~dkarjala/legmats/hatch95.html. 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 57. 537 U.S. at 186. 
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informed by the fact that early Congresses extended the dura-
tion of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights. 
Lower courts saw no ―limited Times‖ impediment to such 
extensions. Further, although this Court never before has had 
occasion to decide whether extending existing copyrights 
complies with the ―limited Times‖ prescription, the Court has 
found no constitutional barrier to the legislative expansion of 
existing patents. . . . Congress‘ consistent historical practice 
reflects a judgment that an author who sold his work a week 
before should not be placed in a worse situation than the author 
who sold his work the day after enactment of a copyright 
extension. The CTEA follows this historical practice by 
keeping the 1976 Act‘s duration provisions largely in place 
and simply adding 20 years to each of them.  
The CTEA is a rational exercise of the legislative authority 
conferred by the Copyright Clause. On this point, the Court 
defers substantially to Congress. . . . The CTEA reflects 
judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments the 
Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature‘s domain. A 
key factor in the CTEA‘s passage was a 1993 European Union 
(EU) directive instructing EU members to establish a baseline 
copyright term of life plus 70 years and to deny this longer 
term to the works of any non-EU country whose laws did not 
secure the same extended term. By extending the baseline 
United States copyright term, Congress sought to ensure that 
American authors would receive the same copyright protection 
in Europe as their European counterparts. The CTEA may also 
provide greater incentive for American and other authors to 
create and disseminate their work in the United States.
58
  
Two points are worth noticing here: first, that extension of term 
that the CTEA implements is a ―rational exercise‖ of legislative 
authority by Congress, which is certainly the case, and second, that 
the retroactive extension is justified by three reasons: (1) as a way of 
providing equal treatment to all copyright holders, (2) as an 
 
 58. Id. at 187–88 (internal citations omitted). 
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―equilibrium‖ response to the EU move of extending copyright to 
seventy years, and (3) because it may provide greater incentive for 
the creation and dissemination of copyrightable work. We argue that 
none of these justifications make sense. 
The copyright term has been repeatedly increased since its initial 
adoption in 1790 when a term of fourteen years was established,
59
 
with major increases taking place in 1831,
60
 1909,
61
 and 1976.
62
 The 
last extension, in The Copyright Act of 1998,
63
 added twenty years to 
the then-existing term.
64
 The CTEA retroactive provision, therefore, 
further extends the term for exactly those items for which the 1976 
Act already had provided a retroactive extension.
65
 In spite of this 
obvious fact, the Court states rather incredibly: ―Concerning 
petitioners‘ assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its 
authority by stringing together an unlimited number of limited Times, 
the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly 
is not the situation before us.‖66  
Let us forget the Court‘s peculiar interpretation of reality and of 
what Congress may or may not be planning to do; after all, we must 
wait until 2018 for a further extension to take place, and, even in that 
case, the arithmetic fact that ninety is not an unlimited number will 
be available to our Supreme Court Justices. Let us try, instead, to see 
why the substantive reasons provided under the second point above 
do not make any sense.  
Consider, first, the equal treatment argument. The Court notes: 
―[S]ince 1790, it has indeed been Congress‘s policy that the author of 
yesterday‘s work should not get a lesser reward than the author of 
 
 59. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (amended 1831). 
 60. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (amended 1870). 
 61. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amended 1976). 
 62. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006)). 
 63. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 
287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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tomorrow‘s work just because Congress passed a statute lengthening 
the term today.‖67  
This is quite fine, indeed. One wonders, though, if the same logic 
should not be applied whenever Congress passes legislation that, by 
affecting, say, the fiscal code impacts on the economic reward that 
private agents receive also are affected. Any income tax cut should, 
then, be retroactive, for it clearly makes no sense to tax past income 
at a higher rate just because Congress passed a statute reducing the 
tax rate today. Quite obviously, the same applies to tax increases, 
Social Security contributions, tariffs, and numerous other areas, 
making for a rather interesting, if not volatile, economic environment. 
This would require very creative budgeting and national income 
accounting procedures, very much to the delight of financial markets 
that notoriously thrive under volatility. Most interestingly, though, 
this would be a case in which Congress—in an uncharacteristic act of 
economic rationality—decided to reduce copyright and patent terms 
at some future date. By the same token for which both Congress and 
the Supreme Court argued for retroactivity in 1998, we suppose, the 
copyright term‘s reduction should also be retroactive to make sure 
that the ―Congress‘s policy that the author of yesterday‘s work should 
not get a‖ larger ―reward than the author of tomorrow‘s work just 
because Congress passed a statute‖ shortening ―the term today‖ be 
dutifully implemented.
68
 Maybe we are not properly trained in the 
subtleties of legal logic, and maybe there is a hidden paragraph 
somewhere in the Court‘s ruling explaining why copyright holders 
are exceptional. We could not find such a paragraph. 
Let us move next to the motivation in (2.ii), that is, reacting to the 
EU‘s decision to extend copyright term to life plus seventy years. 
Again, we quote from the majority opinion: 
By extending the baseline United States copyright term to life 
plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure that American 
authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe 
as their European counterparts. . . . [M]atching th[e] level of 
 
 67. Id. at 204 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jane C. Ginsberg et al., The 
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is too Long?, Professor Arthur 
Miller, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000)). 
 68. Id. 
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[copyright] protection in the United States [to that in the EU] 
can ensure stronger protection for U.S. works abroad and avoid 
competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis foreign rightholders.
69
  
In case you were wondering from where our Supreme Court gets 
its economic wisdom, footnote twelve reports that ―[t]he author of the 
law review article cited in text, Shira Perlmutter, currently a vice 
president of AOL Time Warner, was at the time of the CTEA‘s 
enactment Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs, 
United States Copyright Office.‖70 Let us leave the political economy 
of UIP for later and stick to the logical argument for the time being. 
From the Court‘s own words, it seems purely a redistributive 
concern: If the United States does not raise its copyright term, U.S. 
authors publishing in Europe will receive less money in that market 
than their European counterparts. Again, this is quite fine, in the 
sense that the U.S. Constitution does not prevent Congress from 
redistributing income by various statutory means from one subgroup 
of the population to another. In this case, clearly, Congress must have 
feared that writers, musicians, and assorted movie stars who are 
citizens of the United States would have faced poverty and 
denutrition lacking the additional twenty years of copyright revenues 
from the European markets. Redistributing income to the poor and 
indigent movie stars from the rich and powerful consumers is 
certainly a commendable aim of Congress, if not one explicitly stated 
by the Founding Fathers in the Bill of Rights. One wonders why a 
lump-sum transfer has not been chosen by Congress and 
recommended by the Court; it would have achieved the same 
egalitarian aim while sparing us the distortionary effect of twenty 
additional years of monopoly in the markets for copyrighted 
materials. One wonders if the median voter might have found a new 
tax financing Hollywood stars‘ expensive consumption habits 
somewhat unpatriotic.
71
 
 
 69. Id. at 205–06 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Shira Perlmutter, Participation in 
the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful 
Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 330 (2002)). 
 70. Id. at 206 n.12. 
 71. If readers find our tone somewhat disrespectful of the Supreme Court, we very much 
regret it. 
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The substantive economic point is that the EU decision to extend 
the length of copyright term for its citizens is perfectly immaterial to 
the well being of either U.S. citizens or authors; if anything, it makes 
them better off as long as the copyright term is not extended also in 
the United States. Let us see why. Consider first the fundamental 
economic reason for providing copyright. This says that copyright is 
given to allow creators to collect enough revenue to compensate for 
their creative effort. Consumers, therefore, benefit indirectly from 
copyright because, while paying a monopoly price to creators, 
consumers receive the creation in exchange. Without copyright, 
consumers would receive nothing. The EU move increases such rents 
for European creators and leaves them unaltered for everyone else; 
copyright terms for citizens of other countries were not lowered, 
either in the EU or anywhere else. This implies: (1) EU creators are 
richer; (2) EU consumers may or may not be better off (supposedly, 
they get more creations but, certainly instead of supposedly, also 
more monopoly distortions); (3) U.S. creators are not poorer as they 
receive at least the same rents they received before;
72
 and (4) U.S. 
consumers are better off as they pay the same price as before for 
creative work but now enjoy the supposedly higher number of EU 
creations. In plain words, by extending its copyright by twenty years, 
the EU forced its consumers to face a risky proposition (more 
distortions for possibly more culture) in order to make its creators 
richer. It also did a somewhat equal favor to U.S. creators and 
consumers by strengthening their market position. With the CTEA, 
Congress has ensured that U.S. consumers are forced to face a risky 
proposition, making them worse off than they were in the interim 
period; this is the price paid to transfer additional rents to U.S. 
creators. We therefore reach the same conclusion as before, namely 
that the CTEA is explained by a desire to transfer income from U.S. 
consumers to U.S. producers of copyrighted materials, and that it 
neither improves economic efficiency nor is the appropriate 
 
 72. Our usage of ―at least‖ and ―not poorer‖ is intentional. Indeed, to the extent that 
demand for creative work is downward sloping and creative works are partial substitutes for 
one another, the U.S. creators are actually richer. This is because monopoly prices are higher 
than competitive ones, so if the prices of EU creations increase after the copyright term 
increases there, U.S. creators can keep their products as competitive as they were before in the 
EU markets and still slightly raise their prices. 
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equilibrium response to the EU‘s move. In particular, the 
―competitive disadvantages‖ that AOL vice-president Shira 
Perlmutter mentions
73
 remain completely mysterious. What could 
they be? If the United States had not extended its term, U.S. 
publishers of books, movies, and music could have put on the U.S. 
market many European creations with a copyright expired in the U.S. 
while their European counterparts would have been unable to do so 
for another twenty years. This seems to us an advantage, not a 
disadvantage. At the same time, in the EU markets, EU subsidiaries 
of U.S. publishers could have exploited the longer copyright term to 
earn more monopoly profits at the expense of European consumers. 
At worst, should the EU not have allowed the European subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies to use the additional twenty years of copyright 
protection, they would have had the same competitive stance they 
had had until 1998.  
Finally comes the third and most substantive economic point: ―In 
addition to international concerns, Congress passed the CTEA in light 
of demographic, economic, and technological changes . . . and 
rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage 
copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution 
of their works . . . .‖74 
To which ―rationally credited projections‖ the Court refers, we do 
not know; there is always someone somewhere with a Ph.D. who is 
willing to forecast that elephants will eventually fly if the tax code is 
appropriately changed as recommended by the lobby that financed 
his or her research. The Court reports no numbers, and nowhere in 
the literature are serious numbers to be found that support such a 
forecast. We thus will move on to the theoretical underpinnings of 
this motivation. These are not very clearly spelled out in the Court‘s 
opinion. In particular, the footnotes found between pages 202 and 
205 of the opinion to substantiate the incentive effect are rather 
disappointing. Apparently, the Supreme Court believes that life 
expectancy for creators has increased about twenty years since 1976, 
which is more than ten times the actual value. Equally apparent, the 
same Court also believes that Quincy Jones, Bob Dylan, Carlos 
 
 73. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206 n.12. 
 74. Id. at 206–07 (citations omitted). 
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Santana, and Don Henley wrote what they wrote and played what 
they played because of the ―belief that the copyright system‘s 
assurance of fair compensation for themselves and their heirs was an 
incentive to create.‖75  
No further argument is given in support of the incentive theory, so 
out of respect for the Supreme Court, let us move on to debate those 
academics that, in a somewhat more articulated form, have argued 
that such an incentive exists, is substantial, and follows from well-
founded and well-reasoned microeconomic theory. As William M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner appear to be the two most prolific and 
coherent supporters of this view within the law and economics 
literature, it is to their recent writings that we turn.
76
 
B. Scholarly Pursuits 
The two most significant arguments are that creations of any kind 
should not be left in the public domain because the public domain 
suffers from congestion and overuse, and that IP rights are necessary 
to provide appropriate incentives not only to ―create‖ but also to 
―maintain‖ existing works. Notice the similarity with the ―land 
ownership is good‖ argument, and notice also what this argument 
says: IP is not just good for creating new things, but also for 
maintaining them. Hence, in the case of copyright at least, this line of 
reasoning ends up arguing that an unlimited copyright term may be 
desirable. This line of argument rests on the principle that a 
normative foundation for the law is the maximization of social 
wealth, i.e., the achievement of economic efficiency in the sense of 
Pareto, irrespective of its redistributive consequences among 
economic agents. We are not questioning this principle here, in fact, 
and in spite of personal and philosophical misgivings with both its 
logical foundations and moral implications, we will use it as a 
yardstick in all that follows.  
 
 75. Id. at 207–08 n.15. 
 76. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Eldred and Fair 
Use, 1 THE ECONOMISTS‘ VOICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/voll/iss1/ 
art3. 
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Let us start from the fundamental metaphor according to which 
ideas=pasture; ―[t]he counterpart to the common pasture in 
intellectual property is the public domain. . . . The term refers to the 
vast body of ideas and expression that are not copyrighted, patented, 
or otherwise propertized.‖77 
One reason for rights in ordinary property is indeed to prevent 
congestion and overuse. For example, if a pasture is public, I do not 
take account of the negative effect my grazing sheep have on the 
availability of grass for your sheep. Because roads are public, I do not 
consider that my driving on the road makes it more difficult for you 
to get to work. Because the ocean is public, I do not consider that 
catching fish leaves fewer for you. This is the ―tragedy of the 
commons,‖ and in each case it means that the pasture, road, or ocean 
will be overused.
78
 
Contrary to common wisdom, the public domain for ideas is the 
logical and practical opposite of the common land/pasture/ocean. The 
public domain of ideas is the necessary (not sufficient, but necessary) 
precondition for competition in these markets and social efficiency 
therein. On this we focus, and this is the content of the present 
section.  
Is the public domain for ideas like a common? Does my using 
ideas in the public domain have an adverse effect on your ability to 
use them? Certainly common sense suggests ―[t]here can be no 
overgrazing of intellectual property . . . because intellectual property 
is not destroyed or even diminished by consumption.‖79 That I might 
make use of an idea does not make you less able to use it. Indeed, it 
seems obvious that welfare is increased when more people become 
cognizant of a useful idea, whereas overall productive capacity is not 
increased when more sheep try to eat from the same square foot of 
pasture or when different rescue teams compete in salvaging a single 
sunken ship first. 
 
 77. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 76, at 13. 
 78. Garrett Hardin, Exteriors of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” 280 SCIENCE 682 (1998). 
 79. Id. at 223 (quoting Dennis S. Karjala, ―Statement of Copyright and Intellectual 
Property Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright 
Term Extension Act, Submitted to the Joint Committees of the Judiciary,‖ Jan. 28, 1998, 
http://www.public.asu.edu/ dkarjala/legmats/1998statement/html). 
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As we have seen, Congress and the Supreme Court apparently do 
not agree, and Landes and Posner also claim that ―[r]ecognition of an 
‗overgrazing‘ problem in copyrightable works has lagged.‖80 In fact it 
has not, for there is no coherent theory or evidence that points to such 
a problem. 
There are three key elements to understanding why the arguments 
in favor of retroactive copyright are incoherent. Understand first, 
only copies of ideas matter from an economic standpoint; in fact, 
only copies of ideas matter from any practical standpoint. If all the 
copies in books and minds alike were to vanish, the abstract existence 
of the idea would be of no use, at least to the practical human. 
Understand second, the public domain is not a common of unowned 
ideas or public property. When an idea is in the public domain, 
someone still owns each copy of the idea or work. To make copies 
you will have to own or purchase a copy of the idea first. Rather than 
being like a common, the public domain is like the ideal of a 
competitive market (such as that for wheat) with many owners or 
producers of essentially the same product competing with one 
another. Understand finally, although my using an idea does not 
make you less able to use it, it might well make you less able to sell 
it. This means my ownership of a copy of the same idea as you own 
does not make the idea less valuable from a social point of view, but 
it certainly reduces the market price of your copy. Economists call 
this phenomenon ―pecuniary externality‖;81 my selling to a customer 
changes his demand for your product, and subsequently, economists 
find it a valuable feature of competitive economies. Consumers are 
made better off by the fact that numerous copies of a given good 
exist, as the market price of such good is set by the marginal 
consumer, that is, the one who values it the least, thereby allowing all 
those who value it more to acquire a substantial surplus by 
purchasing their copies of the good at less than its marginal utility.  
Consider the case of food. If my restaurant sells Richard a large 
meal, he is not likely to go across the street to your restaurant and 
buy another. My selling him a large meal does not prevent you from 
using your food, but it does reduce the chances you will sell it to 
 
 80. Id. at 223. 
 81. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 76. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
348 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:325 
 
 
Richard. So too with ideas. If I sell Richard a copy of my Bible, I do 
not prevent you from making copies of your Bible, but I will reduce 
your profit because Richard will not buy from you. This is a 
pecuniary externality. By way of contrast, by taking fish from the sea 
I am not merely competing with you for customers; I am taking an 
economically useful good or service. Economists refer to the former 
as a ―pecuniary‖ externality, and the latter as a ―technological‖ 
externality.
82
 Pecuniary externalities are a good thing; the incentive to 
steal customers is an essential part of the normal and efficient 
functioning of the competitive system. Technological externalities are 
a bad thing, leading to overuse. 
Supporters of IP, and of copyright extension in particular, seem to 
be blind to such distinction. Landes and Posner, who provide the 
most coherent exposition of why retroactive extension of copyright 
might be a good thing, acknowledge that the ―assessment of welfare 
effects of congestion requires distinguishing technological from mere 
pecuniary externalities.‖83 They then go on to say, concerning the 
Mickey Mouse character, that ―[i]f because copyright had expired 
anyone were free to incorporate the Mickey Mouse character in a 
book, movie, song, etc., the value of the character might plummet.‖84 
The value for whom? It cannot be the social value of the Mickey 
Mouse character that plummets—this increases when more people 
have access to it. Rather, it is the market price of copies of the 
Mickey Mouse character that plummets. As Landes and Posner 
admit, ―If this came about only as . . . the ordinary consequence of an 
increase in output, aggregate value would actually increase . . . .‖85 
They then assert that ―the public might rapidly tire of Mickey 
Mouse.‖86 But this is in fact the ordinary consequence of an increase 
in output. If I eat a large meal, I am less hungry—the value to me of a 
meal is diminished, and restaurants will find I am not willing to pay 
them much money. No externality is involved; as more of a good is 
consumed, the more tired people become of it. For there to be an 
 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. at 224. 
 84. Id. at 225. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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externality, it would have to be the case that my consumption of 
Mickey Mouse made you more tired of it—an improbability, to say 
the least. 
Although Landes and Posner make the verbal distinction between 
pecuniary and technological externality, they do not appear to 
understand it. They quote from a book on Disney marketing: ―To 
avoid overkill, Disney manages its character portfolio with care. It 
has hundreds of characters on its books, many of them just waiting to 
be called out of retirement . . . Disney practices good husbandry of its 
characters and extends the life of its brands by not overexposing them 
. . . They avoid debasing the currency.‖87 This is of course exactly 
how we would expect a monopolist to behave. If Disney were to be 
given a monopoly on food, we can be sure it would practice ―good 
husbandry‖ of food, most likely leaving us all on the edge of 
starvation. This would be good for Disney because we all would be 
willing to pay a high price for food. But the losses to the rest of us 
would far outweigh the gain to Disney. It is a relief to know that, 
after all, Mickey Mouse is not such an essential ingredient of the U.S. 
diet. 
In passing, notice here a serious problem with the interpretation of 
economic efficiency that seems to have become common among 
legal scholars writing in this field. In the example above, taking the 
monopoly power over food away from Disney is often interpreted as 
not necessarily efficient. This is because, although consumers are 
better off, the entity called ―Disney‖ is worse off after competition in 
the market for food is established. This is not the appropriate place to 
go through the theorems of modern welfare economics, but it is the 
appropriate place to mention the faulty argument to the interested 
reader, just in case.  
Landes and Posner go on to say:  
One purpose of giving the owner of a copyright a monopoly of 
derivative works is to facilitate the scope and timing of the 
exploitation of the copyrighted work—to avoid, as it were, the 
‗congestion‘ that would result if once the work was published 
 
 87. Id. at 224 (quoting Bill Britt, International Marketing: Disney’s Goals, MARKETING, 
May 17, 1990, at 22, 26). 
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anyone could make and sell translations, abridgements, 
burlesques, sequels, versions in other media from that of the 
original (for example, a movie version of a book), or other 
variants . . . . The result would be premature saturation of the 
market, consumer confusion (for example, as to the source of 
the derivative works), and impaired demand for the original 
work because of the poor quality of some of the unauthorized 
derivative works.
88
  
 This seems to us to be both at odds with reality and profoundly 
anti-market and anti-competition. Yes, the competitive market is full 
of interesting products. We can buy many brands, styles, and colors 
of shirts, jackets, and shoes. Yet apparently consumers are not so 
profoundly ignorant as to be unable to figure out which brands, 
styles, colors, and products they wish to purchase; they apparently do 
not need the Disney Corporation to work this out for them. In the 
competitive markets of the free world, there are lots of good 
products, lots of excellent products, and even more cheap and low-
quality products. So what? Seabright celebrates the diversity 
produced by competition;
89
 Lindsey warns us against those who do 
not trust the decentralization of the free market and wish to bring the 
―dead hand‖ of central authority to sort out the confusion.90 Unlike 
Landes and Posner, we do not see the need for the organizing 
authority of the monopolist to substitute for the diversity of the 
marketplace. 
In an effort to give substance to their argument, Landes and 
Posner point to three examples of ―works even of elite culture that 
may have been damaged by unlimited reproduction,‖ namely, the 
Mona Lisa, the opening of Beethoven‘s Fifth Symphony, and several 
of Van Gogh‘s most popular paintings.91 It would be nice to know 
what evidence Landes and Posner have for this assertion. Searching 
Amazon.com for ―Beethoven‖ in classical music brings up three 
 
 88. Id. at 226. 
 89. See PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 13–15 (2004). 
 90. BRINK LINDSEY, AGAINST THE DEAD HAND: THE UNCERTAIN STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 10–11 (2002). 
 91. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 76, at 226. 
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items as most popular.
92
 The first is a collection of all nine 
symphonies; the second is a compilation of the Fifth and the Seventh. 
Apparently, despite the damage done by unlimited reproduction, the 
Fifth is still well liked by many people—or are we to imagine that 
they skip the opening because it has been so damaged by unlimited 
reproduction? Or are Professors Landes and Posner suffering from 
the snobbish tendency to consider works of art ―debased‖ after they 
become known and appreciated by the ―unrefined‖ masses? 
More or less the opposite of the ―overgrazing‖ argument is the 
―maintenance‖ argument. Here it is argued that only with a monopoly 
is there adequate incentive to ―maintain‖ ideas. The extreme example 
of the ―maintenance‖ argument is the argument that providing a 
copyright monopoly will actually increase availability, the Register 
of Copyrights going so far as to say ―lack of copyright protection . . . 
restrains dissemination of the work.‖93 Lemley, who criticizes what 
he refers to as ex post arguments for copyright along lines that 
parallel our own,
94
 puts it succinctly: ―It is hard to imagine Senators, 
lobbyists, and scholars arguing with a straight face that the 
government should grant one company the perpetual right to control 
the sale of all paper clips in the country, on the theory that otherwise 
no one will have an incentive to make and distribute paper clips.‖95 
Lemley also cites empirical evidence showing, not surprisingly, that 
public domain works are far more widely available than works from 
the same time period that are still under copyright.
96
 
 
 92. Amazon.com, Amazon‘s Beethoven Store, http://www.amazon.com (search 
―Beethoven‖) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 93. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 
989, H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1734 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 161, 171, 
188 (1996) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for 
Copyright Services, Library of Congress). 
 94. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property 6 
(Feb. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, http://ssrn.com/abstract=494424). We should point 
out that Lemley‘s argument that if monopoly rights are provided there is no reason to provide 
them to the creator is incorrect. Regardless of who starts with the monopoly rights, as long as 
they can be sold without prohibitive transactions costs, they will wind up in the hands of 
whoever can manage them the most efficiently. In practice, most copyrights are in fact 
transferred to corporations and publishers. If monopoly rights are to be provided, the advantage 
of providing them to the creator (other than the obvious difficulty of figuring to whom else to 
give them) is that it creates an additional incentive for creation, however miniscule it might be. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Id. at 8–9. 
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A bit less illogical is the following type of argument. We can 
imagine that Disney might have less incentive to produce new 
Mickey Mouse movies if it faces competition in the market for 
Mickey Mouse dolls; some of the good feeling for Mickey Mouse 
generated by the movie will spill over into increased demand for 
other producers‘ Mickey Mouse dolls. This would appear to be, 
indeed, a case of real externality, albeit positive instead of negative. 
Lacking a way of compensating Disney for the positive effect it is 
having on the demand for Mickey Mouse dolls, Disney‘s movie 
output would be too low from a social viewpoint. This analysis is 
wrong. Mickey Mouse movies and Mickey Mouse dolls are examples 
of goods that are complements; increasing the quantity of one raises 
the demand for the other. But many goods are complements, such as 
peanut butter and jelly. And quite rightly, no one worries that there 
will not be enough peanut butter produced because part of the effect 
of producing more peanut butter is that it will raise the demand for 
jelly. Basically, what this argument overlooks is the reciprocal effect: 
When the competition produces more Mickey Mouse dolls, it also 
will raise the demand for the Mickey Mouse movie. 
Landes and Posner also try a more subtle tack. They focus not so 
much on tie-ins between related goods, but rather on ―promotional‖ 
efforts. ―[C]onsider an old movie on which copyright had expired 
that a studio wanted to issue in a colorized version . . . . Promoting 
the colorized version might increase the demand for the black and 
white version, a close substitute. . . . [T]he studio would have to take 
into account, in deciding whether to colorize, the increase in demand 
for the black and white version.‖97 Here it seems that promotion of 
the colorized film is a complement to both consumption of the 
colorized film and the black and white version; insofar as it is merely 
a statement about goods being complements, we already have seen 
there is no economic issue. But more to the point, in all competitive 
markets, producers lack incentives to promote the industry. 
Individual wheat producers do not have much incentive to promote 
the healthy virtues of wheat, fisherman do not have much incentive to 
promote the healthy virtues of fish, and so on.
98
 It is hard to see that 
 
 97. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 76, at 229. 
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the problem with old movies, books, and music is different either 
qualitatively or quantitatively than in these other competitive 
markets. Yet quite rightly no one argues that we need to grant wheat 
or fish monopolies to solve the ―problem‖ of under promotion. 
It is worth reflecting briefly on promotional activities in 
competitive industries. Surely information about, say, the health 
benefits of fish is useful to consumers; equally surely, no individual 
fisher has much incentive to provide this information. Is this some 
form of market failure? No. In a private ownership economy, 
consumers will have to pay for useful information rather than having 
it provided for free by producers. And pay they do; doctors, health 
advisors, and magazine publishers all provide this type of information 
for a fee. There is no evidence that competitive markets under-
provide product information. Rather, in the case of a monopolist, 
because the value of the product mostly goes to the monopolist 
instead of the consumer, the consumer has little incentive to acquire 
information while the monopolist has a lot of incentive to see that the 
consumer has access to it. So we expect a different arrangement for 
information provision (―promotion‖) in competitive and non-
competitive markets. In the former, the consumer pays, and 
competitive providers generate information. In the latter, firms will 
subsidize the provision of information.
99
 
II. MORE COMMON FALLACIES 
Additional theoretical and empirical work is needed to better 
understand the impact that IP has on innovation, creation, and overall 
economic welfare. In the sixty years since the end of World War II, 
abundant research has been produced on this subject, though very 
little has taken a critical approach. In fact, until the events of the late 
1990s somewhat helped to re-open the debate, most research 
supported the general principle that IP is good for society at large. 
 
by some industry-wide association and not by individual firms. 
 99. Of course, the monopolist, unlike the competitive providers, will have no incentive to 
provide accurate information. We rarely see Disney advertising that, however true it might be, 
its new Mickey Mouse movie is poor, and we should go see the old Mickey Mouse movie 
instead. 
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For the most part, these arguments are incorrect, and to their common 
fallacy we now turn.  
Instead of arguing whether IP protection should be extended, if its 
term should be of twenty years for patents and seventy-five for 
copyright, or possibly vice versa, we would like to question the very 
same idea that IP is necessary and useful for fostering invention. Our 
contention is the following: Allowing for a few minor exceptions, IP 
is not necessary for efficient innovation. The efficient allocation of 
surplus from innovation can and would be achieved by properly 
regulated competitive markets, and such distribution of surplus 
among inventors, imitators, and consumers could provide, on 
average, the correct incentives for the efficient amount of creation to 
take place in society. Therefore, as a matter of legislative principles, 
IP should be abolished and replaced with the opposite system of 
property rights, a system in which creators have the same rights as 
other producers (that is, the right to own and sell the fruits of their 
work, and in which legal monopoly power is not assigned to them 
over their ideas, unless a substantial case is made that the innovation 
could not materialize lacking the specific monopoly privilege).  
To understand the common fallacy one needs to start by 
examining the basic principle, put forward long ago by Kenneth 
Arrow.
100
 Specifically, Arrow asserted that ideas and information 
constituted a very peculiar kind of commodity, unsuitable to be 
traded in a competitive market.
101
 This is not true; along most 
dimensions, ideas are not different form other commodities, and 
those few dimensions along which ideas are different do not 
generally affect the functioning of competitive markets. Here are 
some often-heard arguments, which we have shown to be fallacious. 
It is argued that in competitive markets innovators would be 
unable to appropriate more than an infinitesimal share of the social 
value of their ideas.  
This is a recurrent theme in business, managerial, and industrial 
organization literature, where it is apparently believed that economic 
 
 100. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
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(1962). 
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efficiency requires innovators (or producers more generally) to 
appropriate all the social value of their products. Were this to be the 
case, any market transaction in which some positive social surplus is 
realized would be inefficient, for producers are ―leaving something 
on the table‖ for consumers. But, obviously, socially efficient 
provision of ideas or goods requires, instead, that all ideas or goods 
with a positive social surplus (i.e., social value larger or at most equal 
to social cost) be produced. How such surplus is split between 
producers, consumers, and other entities (suppliers of intermediate 
inputs, government, and so on) may, and, in general will, affect 
whether all goods with positive social surplus are produced, but there 
is no general presumption that too few goods will be created unless 
producers appropriate the whole social surplus. In general, we would 
expect producers to bring goods or ideas to the market as long as the 
private costs of doing so are exceeded by the private gains.  
Hence, from a social perspective, one should ask: For all ideas 
with a positive social surplus, is it the case that competitive pricing 
allows producers to appropriate enough revenues to compensate for 
their private opportunity cost? Strangely enough, this question is 
seldom asked in the theoretical literature on innovations, and never, 
to the best of our knowledge, in the empirical literature. This fallacy, 
as we have shown,
102
 misses the fact that ideas combine attributes of 
both consumption and capital goods. They can be used directly for 
consumption, such as reading a book or watching a movie, or they 
can be used as an input in production by making copies of a book or 
movie, or by producing other goods (for example, by using the idea 
for an improved production process). That the original copy of an 
idea is the capital good (the tree) from which all other copies (the 
fruits) must originate enables innovators to appropriate the net 
present value of all future copies through competitive pricing. Corn 
seeds, for example, can be eaten or used for producing additional 
corn, so corn seeds combine characteristics of consumption and 
 
 102. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY (2008); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture: The 
Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, 45 INT‘L ECON. REV. 327, 327–50 (2004); Michele 
Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 NAT‘L 
ACAD. SCI. 1252, 1252–56 (2005). 
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capital goods. Competitive markets for corn generate the appropriate 
incentive to invest in corn seed. The initial copy (or copies, when 
simultaneous innovation occurs) of an idea are generally produced 
through a process that is different from the one used to make 
subsequent copies, as in the case of original research versus teaching. 
Most capital goods (original research) are used to produce 
commodities other than themselves, but the fact that capital goods 
might be used to reproduce themselves poses no particular problem 
for competitive markets. In the semi-conductor industry, for example, 
reduction in chip size makes it possible to construct capital 
equipment that can be used to produce even smaller chips. 
There are suggestions that ideas are subject to “spillover 
externalities,” or what we might call informational leakage. That is, 
the existence of the idea enables people to learn it and make use of it 
without the permission of the owners.  
Some even argue that ideas can be copied for free. In practice, few 
ideas are subject to informational leakage and in all cases are costly 
to reproduce. In the case of copyrightable creations, where the ideas 
are embodied in physical objects such as books, informational 
leakage is not an issue. In the case of scientific advances, reflection 
shows that it is also not the case. Although in some sense scientific 
ideas are widely available, usable copies of scientific ideas are not so 
easy to come by. Even Newton‘s laws, our example in the next 
section, require a substantial amount of time and effort to understand. 
For all practical purposes, copies are limited to those people who 
understand the laws and books that explain them. Without paying 
someone to teach you or buying a book that explains Newton‘s laws, 
you are not terribly likely to learn them merely because they are in 
the public domain. As teachers and professors, we earn our living by 
our ability to communicate ideas to others, and in doing so, we create 
new copies of them. Overwhelming historical evidence shows that 
diffusion and adoption of innovations is costly and time consuming.  
Leaving ideas in the public domain, as would be the case under a 
no-IP system, is socially inefficient and leads to a “tragedy of the 
commons” for creative activity.  
We have already explained why this claim is fundamentally 
incorrect. After copyright or patents have expired, there are many 
copies of an idea, each a good substitute for the other, and each 
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owned by someone. If you want to use the idea, make copies, or turn 
it into something else, you must first acquire a copy of it from one of 
the current owners. If there are many owners, each competing with 
one another to sell you the copy of the idea, you might be able to 
obtain it relatively cheaply, even though you intend to turn it into a 
highly valued new good. But the fact that you can buy ingredients 
cheaply is a good consequence of competitive markets, not a bad one. 
In fact, the evidence suggests that the market for goods in the public 
domain functions well, with copies widely available and reasonably 
priced. Finding a copy of a book by Dickens, for example, is no great 
problem.  
III. THINKING OUT OF THE UIP BOX 
We have worked out elsewhere mathematical and quantitative 
models of why creative activity can thrive under conditions of 
competition and does not require, at least in principle, the monopoly 
privileges that current IP legislation attributes to creators and 
inventors.
103
 Here we illustrate the basic intuition underlying our 
analysis, using a well-known historical example to fix ideas. 
Economic, and more generally social, progress is the long-run, 
and altogether surprising, result of the continuous creation of new 
commodities, of their free exchange among individuals, and of the 
competition among producers of different goods, be they creators or 
imitators. Economists have long realized that there would be but a 
slow and possibly inconsequential improvement in human living 
standards without sustained innovation. This point was argued most 
forcefully by Joseph Schumpeter in The Theory of Economic 
Development.
104
 With constant technology and a constant set of 
goods, the process of capital accumulation, when based only on the 
saving of a share of the yearly income flow, would generate but a 
fraction of the growth in per capita income we have witnessed since 
the inception of human history. History and common sense suggest 
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that accumulation of capital under a constant technology cannot go 
very far due to the presence of fixed resources and the diminishing 
returns they cause. Innovation is the engine of change and economic 
development; hence, understanding its nature, internal mechanisms, 
and the social and institutional factors that bring it about or impede it 
is, we believe, the single most important problem faced by the social 
sciences. It is our contention that understanding innovation is 
tantamount to understanding competition, that the latter is a necessary 
condition for the former, and that, under very general circumstances, 
it is also sufficient. If innovation is the flow that enriches us all, then 
competition is the spring from which it erupts. 
Innovation, for us, is the creation of the first copy of a good, 
process, or idea that did not exist before. As the word ―idea‖ is used 
here to denote all innovations, its usage should be briefly clarified. In 
our terminology, Isaac Newton‘s innovation did not consist just in 
―thinking‖ the gravitational laws, but in the process of embodying 
them in his mind first, and in formulas and written expositions later. 
When, in 1687, he completed the manuscript of his Philosophiae 
naturalis principia mathematica (―Principia‖) and had it published, 
―Newton‘s innovation‖ was completed.105 All subsequent copies of 
the Principia were reproductions of that first copy of his idea, and 
they were produced with a technology different from the one he used 
to obtain his first manuscript. Notice, that with ―copy‖ here we refer 
to either a physical copy of the actual book or the copy of the 
gravitational laws embodied in the brain of another scientist or 
layman, i.e., a piece of socially valuable human capital. Indeed, and 
this is something crucial, the social value of Newton‘s innovation is 
more properly measured by the number of copies of his laws existing 
in the second form (actual human capital) than in the first (copies of 
the book). All such copies stemmed from Newton‘s original copy, 
and the social value of the latter would have been much smaller, or 
even negligible, without them. Newton‘s reward, in terms of either 
intellectual prestige or actual wealth and social status, became so 
high because several copies (of either type) of the Principia were 
eventually reproduced. In our terminology, the first copy of the 
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gravitational laws is the ―prototype,‖ and it embodies, for the first 
time, Newton‘s idea; the innovation technology is the one Newton 
adopted to figure out the gravitational laws and write the Principia. 
The imitation technology is the one used by subsequent publishers of 
the book and by whoever learned and understood the content of the 
Principia. Notice that the Principia were published before the Statute 
of Anne introduced some (weak by current standard) degree of IP 
legislation in the United Kingdom.
106
 
Also notice that the final products of the two technologies are, 
functionally speaking, equivalent: A copy of the Principia is a copy 
of the Principia, and a human who understands the principles and 
laws of gravitation is, at least from this narrow point of view, 
equivalent to any other human who understands the same principles 
and laws. This point will become relevant later on when discussing 
the public domain for ideas. Also worth noting is that both 
technologies use a variety of inputs to obtain their final product, that 
some of these inputs are previous innovations (e.g., Kepler‘s Laws), 
and that such inputs can be acquired on competitive markets under 
No Intellectual Property (―NIP‖), but would have to be obtained from 
monopolists by acquiring many licenses under IP. There are two 
exceptions to this. First, the innovation technology uses a particularly 
scarce input, Newton‘s geniality in this case, which greatly limits the 
number of initial prototypes that can be obtained. Had we been 
concerned with a less dramatic invention, simultaneous creation by a 
number of different and independent innovators would have been 
likely, as is often the case in practice. Still, the total amount of 
―creative ability‖ available at any point in time to make prototypes of 
new ideas is quite limited. In the jargon of economics, there is always 
limited creative capacity of prototypes at any given point in time. In 
the particular case of scientific inventions or of artistic creation, this 
limitation of creative capacity may persist for a long time: New 
scientific discoveries are very difficult to understand (which is why 
we have Ph.D. and post-doctorate programs), and live performances 
of new music is hard to imitate. The imitation technology also uses a 
special kind of input, and that is a pre-existing copy of the Principia 
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(in case we are considering a publisher making copies of the book) 
or, generally, someone who has already understood its content (in 
case we are considering a student learning gravitational laws). Either 
way, also this particular input is in limited supply; strictly speaking, 
this is true at any point in time and even now, but it is especially true 
in periods close to the time in which the first prototype of the 
Principia appeared. In summary, the imitation technology also faces 
a limited productive capacity, the size of which is basically 
determined by the number of copies of the idea ―Newton‘s 
Gravitational Laws‖ embodied in humans and books at any point in 
time. 
A little reflection shows that this set of properties is not specific to 
the particular case of the Principia, but applies quite widely (we 
would say universally) to other innovations. The differences are 
quantitative, never qualitative. New valuable ideas are always 
embodied in either people or things; innovative capacity is always 
limited; imitation or reproduction always requires copies of the idea 
and hence stems from the original prototype even if in some rare 
cases imitation may not require large investments; reproductive 
capacity is also limited for a substantial number of periods after the 
innovation takes place; new ideas almost always require old ideas to 
be created, and creation is more and more a complex and cumulative 
incremental process; and finally, consumers are always impatient and 
want the product or good today rather than tomorrow. Our theoretical 
analysis builds upon such properties, and an additional one: it took 
quite a while for Newton to come up with the gravitational laws 
(falling apples notwithstanding) and, from what we know, even 
longer to fully articulate them in the manuscript of the Principia. 
Further, the Principia were not a minor, infinitesimal departure from 
or improvement upon previous knowledge, but a substantial 
advancement indeed. This property is also general, at least 
qualitatively. Producing the prototype via the invention technology 
requires quite often a large investment, which we want to think of as 
an indivisibility. Although it is not true that a sizeable indivisibility is 
involved with the production of prototypes of every idea, it is true 
that this is often the case, and that this feature of creative activity 
should be taken in proper account when discussing the allocation of 
economic surplus from creative activity. 
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Finally, a few words to further clarify our approach to the 
problem. We ask what is socially optimal and how incentives should 
be provided (i.e., which market structure can provide the appropriate 
incentives) for the socially optimal amount of creative activity to take 
place. The problem of providing incentives for innovation should not 
be confused with the protection of rents of intermediaries or rents of 
established artists or creators more generally. The issue here is not 
what makes creators richer or as rich as possible, but how to allocate 
to them enough of the surplus from creative activity so that they have 
the incentive to carry it out efficiently from a social view point. This 
requires focusing on the concept of opportunity cost. When a 
potential innovator considers the choice between engaging in creative 
activity or doing something else, his opportunity cost is determined 
by how much income he would receive from doing something else. 
Efficiency requires that, should the innovator opt for creation, he 
receive from the former at least as much as he would receive from the 
alternative activity; that is his opportunity cost. When the market 
structure allows the innovator to receive more than his opportunity 
cost, this additional rent serves no socially useful purpose. This 
additional rent may just be a pure transfer, which does not affect 
economic efficiency. Nevertheless, more often than not, and in 
particular when monopoly power is involved, this additional rent 
accrues to the innovator because he or she has the incentive to 
provide less innovations, or less copies of his or her innovations, than 
the socially efficient amount. In this case the additional rent is not 
just a neutral transfer from consumers to innovators (which may be 
unfair, but irrelevant for efficiency) but a socially costly and 
inefficient tax on consumers, resulting in fewer copies of ideas to be 
available than is desirable and technologically feasible. Our critique 
of current IP laws focuses mainly on this second aspect. 
Technological innovation continuously changes the opportunity 
cost and reservation values of the various agents involved in creation. 
So, for example, the invention of the printing press made the 
craftsmanship accumulated through centuries by artisans and monks 
unnecessary for copying or for production of new books. This was a 
blessing for writers and their readers but also a curse for those 
artisans who suddenly lost their long-established title to a substantial 
share of the value of every book. Given current technologies and the 
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continuous improvement in the innovation and reproduction of 
technologies, it would be crucial to measure the opportunity costs of 
creators and innovators. Unfortunately, this is an endeavor to which 
applied economists, especially in the area of industrial organization, 
have dedicated minimal attention, and we are not aware of any study 
estimating the minimum future expected income needed to attract 
potential innovators into creative activity.  
CONCLUSION 
Although the functioning of competition in the market for goods 
has been the subject of study for a long time and our knowledge of 
the subject appears to have progressed substantially since the times of 
Adam Smith, it often is felt that the same is not true of the market for 
ideas. Indeed, there is a widespread view that ideas are dramatically 
and intrinsically different from goods and that the ―economics of 
knowledge‖ needs to be grounded on different premises and must 
adopt modeling strategies different from the rest of economics. In our 
work, we reconsidered this issue and concluded that, although the 
economic theory of ideas requires modifications in some of the more 
common assumptions with which markets for regular commodities 
are handled, such differences are much less dramatic than one would 
have expected, and a great deal of common economic wisdom applies 
equally well to the economics of knowledge. This allows us to 
critically reconsider a number of theoretical issues sitting at the 
intersection between the innovation, technological change, and 
growth and trade theory, to conclude that much common wisdom, 
including the legal wisdom bestowed upon us by the Supreme Court, 
is either empirically groundless or logically faulty, and that some old, 
possibly uncommon, wisdom should be brought back to bear on the 
study of technological change, growth, and trade.  
Central to understanding the market for ideas and the incentives 
for the adoption of new ideas is discovering how ideas might be 
different from other goods. The starting point of the economic 
analysis of innovation is to recognize that the economically relevant 
unit is a copy of an idea. Typically, many copies of an idea exist in 
physical form, such as a book, computer file, or piece of equipment, 
or in the form of knowledge embodied in people who know and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/11
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Market Structure and Property Rights 363 
 
 
understand the idea. When embodied in humans, copies of ideas are 
labeled with a variety of different names, which often obscure their 
common nature: skills, knowledge, human capital, norms, and so on. 
Careful inspection shows, however, that each and every one of these 
apparently different entities is, at the end, nothing but the embodied 
copy of an idea, and that it was either discovered first by the person 
in whom it is currently embodied, or costly acquired (possibly via 
observation and imitation) from other humans, in whom it had been 
previously and similarly embodied. Economically valuable copies of 
ideas do not fall from the heavens like manna but are the product of 
intentional and costly human efforts. Only these copies matter for 
two reasons. First, if they were all to be erased, the idea would no 
longer have any economic value. Second, the copies are relatively 
good substitutes for one another. Whether a copy of an idea is the 
original copy or the hundredth copy, it is equally economically 
useful. From the perspective of the functioning of markets, then, 
property rights in copies of ideas are assured by the ordinary laws 
against theft; what is ordinarily referred to as ―intellectual property‖ 
protects not the ownership of copies of ideas but rather a monopoly 
over how other people make use of their copies of an idea.  
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